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NOTES
THE INDIGENT'S "RIGHT" TO COUNSEL IN
CIVIL CASES
I.

INTRODUCTION

The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution expressly provides
a right to counsel in criminal cases, but is silent as to any similar right in civil
cases.' The failure of the courts to recognize a right to counsel of an indigent
in a civil action has led to considerable controversy. There has been,
however, a noticeable reluctance to discuss the rights of the appointed
counsel, if any, to compensation for his services.
This Note will examine the continuing debate concerning the indigent's
right to counsel in civil actions as well as the oft-neglected rights of the
appointed counsel. In addition, two inherent practical problems involved
with court appointed counsel will be considered: the source from which a
court may seek to appoint an attorney and the source of funds from which
any compensation awarded by the courts or by statute may be derived.
I1.

THE

INCREASING SCOPE OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN

CRIMINAL CASES

At present, the Supreme Court recognizes no express right to counsel in
civil cases. Whether the Supreme Court will eventually hold that an indigent
civil litigant is, under some circumstances, entitled as a matter of right to
have counsel appointed by the court is at this point conjectural. No discussion
of the issue is meaningful, however, without a review of the scope of the right
to counsel in criminal cases.
The Supreme Court in Betts v. Brady2 established the rule that "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial." 3 Some
twenty-one years later, however, this principle was reversed in the landmark
decision of Gideon v. Wainwright.4 The Court in Gideon held that the right
to counsel in felony cases was a "fundam'ental" right.S It is apparent from the
1. The sixth amendment reads in pertinent part that -[iln
all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." U.S. Const.
amend. VI.
What the words "criminal prosecutions" include is questionable. That is, there may be certain
actions which appear criminal in nature, but which, for purposes of constitutional right to
counsel provisions, are deemed civil. The converse is also true. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
17 (1967) (delinquency proceeding); Powell v. State, 19 Ariz. App. 377, 507 P.2d 989 (Qd Div.

1973) (habeas corpus proceeding not a criminal action); Honore v. Washington State Bd. of
Prison Terms & Paroles, 77 Wash. 2d 660, 676-77, 466 P.2d 485, 494-95 (1970) (same).
2. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
3. 316 U.S. at 471.

4. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Defendant Gideon was charged with a felony, but was denied
appointment of counsel under a Florida rule calling for such appointment only when the
defendant is charged with a capital offense. Id. at 337.
5. Id. at 342. Though the Court in Gideon was relying on the -fundamental" right theory, it
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opinion, however, that the Court
never intended to restrict the right to
6
counsel to felony cases alone.
The most significant development in this area since Gideon is found in
Argersinger v. Hamlin,7 where the Court expressly extended the right to
appointed counsel to misdemeanor cases. 8 The Court, however, did not rely
on the "fundamental" right theory it had enunciated in Gideon. Instead, the
Court discussed the assistance of counsel in terms of the right to a fair trial. 9
This approach, with its inherent concept of fairness, is of course much less
restrictive than the "fundamental" right standard and lends itself much more
readily to application in civil cases.
should be noted that in its decision, the Court declined to draw any arbitrary distinction between
capital and non-capital criminal offenses. As will be seen, the Court has consistently avoided
drawing any such lines in right to counsel cases. See note 6 infra.
Courts, including the Supreme Court, have applied the right to appointed counsel requirements
in situations which the average layman might consider outside the criminal arena, but which are
viewed as otherwise by the judiciary. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court was faced with
a delinquency proceeding. Though clearly not in the nature of what is usually deemed criminal,
the Court, on the theory that a proceeding to determine delinquency could result in certain
curtailments of freedom by commitment to an institution, found that due process required both
the child and the parents to be notified and the child to be represented by counsel, appointed If
necessary. Id. at 41.
While freedom is curtailed in these delinquency proceedings by commitment in an institution, it
is submitted that freedom can also be curtailed in other ways, both economically and socially,
without actual physical restraint. See Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due
Process Standards, and the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 Iowa L. Rev. 223,
248 (1970).
6. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972). Since this pronouncement in Gideon,
there have been cases dealing with specific chargeable offenses in which the Court has indicated
the scope of the Gideon rule. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790-91 (1973) (no
constitutional requirement to appoint counsel for indigents in every probation or parole revocation case); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42 (1967) (requirement of appointed counsel in a proceeding to
determine deliquency).
7. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). In this case, no felony charge was involved; the defendant was tried for
an offense punishable by a $1000 fine, imprisonment up to six months, or both. Id. at 26. The
state court had decided that the right to counsel applied "only when the offense carries a possible
penalty of more than six months imprisonment." State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d
442, 444 (Fla. 1970), rev'd, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
8. 407 U.S. at 37. The offense charged was clearly a misdemeanor. The Court restricted its
decision to those misdemeanors "that end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty." Id.
at 40. This does not mean, however, that a blanket rule will never or should never be announced.
A survey of states taken in 1970 demonstrated that many states have themselves been moving
along the lines begun by the Court in Gideon, even without the impetus of Supreme Court
declarations. See Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty
States, 3 Creighton L. Rev. 103 (1970). As of 1970, some twelve states provided for appointment
of counsel to indigents who were accused of serious misdeameapor crimes. Id, at 119-24.
Nineteen states so provided in most misdemeanor cases. Id. at 124-33. Overall, more than a
majority of states had extended the Gideon rule to offenses less serious than felonies. Id. at 134.
One state, California, required the appointment of counsel for traffic violations. Blake v.
Municipal Court, 242 Cal. App. 2d 731, 51 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1st Dist. 1966).
9. 407 U.S. at 31, 33.
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In Douglas v. California,10 the Supreme Court held that the appointment of
counsel for an indigent criminal defendant on his first appeal as of right is
constitutionally required. II Recently, in Ross v. Moffitt, 12 the Supreme Court
again discussed the rights of an indigent criminal defendant to appointed
counsel in terms of fairness. The Court held that an indigent criminal
defendant is not entitled to appointed counsel for purposes of obtaining
discretionary appellate review or for petitioning for certiorari to the Supreme
Court. 13 The Court thus refused to extend its Douglas decision. 14 In determining what is fair, the Ross Court drew a distinction between the actual trial of
a criminal defendant and any subsequent discretionary appeal taken by him.
The Court reasoned that at the trial stage, the defendant is being "haled into
court," while at the appellate level, it is the defendant himself who initiates
the discretionary appellate proceeding to which the state has given no one an
absolute right.15 Accordingly, a state is not acting unfairly in failing to
appoint counsel in his discretionary appeal to the higher state court. Rather,
there is only unfairness when the state has singled out the indigent and, solely
because of poverty, denied him meaningful access to the appellate system to
6
which he has a statutory right.'
The actual scope of the Ross holding is at present uncertain. Although the
Court sought to limit its discussion to the issue of right to appointed counsel
in obtaining a discretionary appellate review, its reasoning leads one to the
conclusion that even if a defendant succeeds in obtaining review, he would7
still not be entitled to appointed counsel at the actual appellate proceeding. '
10.

372 U.S. 353 (1963).

11.

Id. at 356-57. In Douglas, the Court held unconstitutional a state requirement for

appointment of counsel on appeal only when the appellate court had determined that counsel

would be of assistance either to the defendant or the court. The operation of this requirement was
found to discriminate unjustly between the indigent and the affluent. Id. at 356.
12. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
13. Id. at 617-19.

14.

It was because of the decision in Douglas that the Court chose to discuss both due process

and equal protection in the Ross case. Id. at 608-09. As noted, due process "emphasizes fairness
between the State and the individual . . . regardless of how other individuals in the same

situation may be treated." Id. at 609. On the other hand, equal protection "emphasizes disparity
in treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable." Id; see Palmer, Implementing the Obligation of Advocacy in Review of Criminal
Convictions, 65 J. Crim. L. & C. 267, 282 (1974).
15. 417 U.S. at 610-11.
16. Id. at 611.

17. Such a conclusion is supported by the interpretation given to the state's statutory
provision calling for appointment of counsel. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-451(b}t6) (Cum Supp
1974). The section as it now reads is an amended version of the one on which the Supreme Court
commented in Ross. The prior section had been construed as excluding appointment of counsel
where discretionary or permissive appeals were involved. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650, 652 (4th
Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). Since the Supreme Court noted this interpretation and
seemingly approved it, it is a logical inference that counsel would not be required to be appointed
at the actual proceeding after the discretionary appeal has been granted. See 417 US. at 614 &
n. 11. It is recognized, however, that the new state statutory provision may at some time in the
future be given a different interpretation.
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The Court noted, and deemed somewhat significant, the fact that the purposes of the discretionary appeal involved in Ross were of an unusual nature,
as the reason for such review was not to decide whether there had been a
proper adjudication of guilt at the lower court level.' 8 As such, it may be
argued that the Ross decision will be limited to its peculiar facts and
circumstances. The distinction found by the Court between the trial stage and
the discretionary appellate stage may become dubious when the Court is faced
with a case involving the usual appellate procedures, different from those
presented in Ross.
In Douglas, Justice Harlan, in dissent, stated that he failed to see a
difference between an initial appeal as a matter of right and any other
subsequent appellate or review procedures.19 As he viewed it,
the requirements of fair procedure are [not] exhausted once an indigent has been given
one appellate review.... Nor can it well be suggested that having appointed counsel
is more necessary to the fair administration of justice in an initial appeal taken as a
matter of right . . . than in a petition asking a higher appellate court to exercise its
discretion to consider what may be a substantial constitutional claim. 2 0
18. Although the appeal is labeled as discretionary, the type of appeal presented in Ross is
actually regulated by a state statute which provides that review is to be taken by the state's
highest court when that court determines that "(1) The subject matter of the appeal has
significant public interest, or (2) The cause involves legal principles of major significance to the
jurisprudence of the State, or (3) The decision of the Court of Appeals appears likely to be in
conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-31(c) (Repi. Vol. 1969). The
purposes served by such an appeal are clearly different from those of the ordinary criminal
appellate proceeding.
19. 372 U.S. at 366 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see Day, Coming: The Right to Have Assistance
of Counsel at All Appellate Stages, 52 A.B.A.J. 135 (1966).
20. 372 U.S. at 366 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Harlan's discussion
raises another question which is relevant in an attempt to define the potential scope of the Ross
holding. The Supreme Court in Ross spoke in terms of the purpose of the discretionary appeal in
North Carolina and reached the conclusion that there was no necessity for appointed counsel in
obtaining such an appeal. See 417 U.S. at 615. Similarly, when an individual petitions for
certiorari to the Supreme Court, the first issue raised is whether certiorari should be granted so as
to allow such petitioner to appear before the Court for review. The Court has long denied the
appointment of counsel to individuals merely for purposes of petitioning for certiorari. Id. at 617;
see Oppenheimer v. California, 374 U.S. 819 (1963) (mem.) (motion for appointment of counsel
denied); Drumm v. California, 373 U.S. 947 (1963) (mem.) (same); 27 Vand. L. Rev. 365, 366
(1974).
However, if one accepts the suggestion that Ross may also be seen as denying the right to
counsel at the appellate proceeding after the court has granted the appeal, then the truly
analogous situation would be the presentation of argument before the Supreme Court after the
grant of certiorari (as opposed to the petition for certiorari). It is the common practice of the
Supreme Court to appoint counsel to represent an indigent when his case is to be briefed and
argued before the Court. Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 Minn. L.
Rev. 783, 797 (1961).
Some would like to see the Court change its practice. See id. It has been argued that
"[c]ertiorari practice constitutes a highly specialized aspect of appellate work." Id. In making the
decision to petition for certiorari and in understanding the factors which the Supreme Court looks
for in such a petition, the aid of a trained attorney is essential. Id.
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In this statement, Justice Harlan has at least implied that once an appellate
process has been invoked in a criminal case and the defendant is before the
court for actual review, the preservation of the integrity of the judicial system
may require court appointed counsel for an indigent appellant, and that this
consideration is at the heart of any fairness concept. If the Ross case is seen as
denying the right to counsel at the appellate proceeding after discretionary
review has been granted, then the Court's rationale in Ross seems almost
irrelevant. The inconsistency lies in the recognition that once an appellate
court has agreed to accept an appeal-be it as a matter of right or of
discretion-there would appear to be no practical distinction in the conduct of
the two respective appellate proceedings.
The problem of right to counsel in discretionary criminal appeal cases is
closely analogous to the right to counsel problem in civil cases since there is
no absolute right to initiate civil litigation, but just an opportunity. Obviously, if the Court continues to follow the rationale of Ross in determining
what is fair, when there is in fact no legal right, but just an opportunity
afforded a litigant to appeal, no rationale upon which a civil right to counsel
2
could be based will be logically forthcoming from this line of cases. '
III.

APPOINTED COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES

A. The "Right" to Counsel in Civil Cases
Rights of civil litigants have always taken a subordinate position to rights
of criminal defendants, at least in the constitutional sense. This of course can
be attributed to the presence of the sixth amendment in the Bill of Rights.22
The courts have, however, begun to recognize that in some narrow circumstances civil litigants do in fact have a right to unfettered access to the
judicial process and a right to the services of an attorney after they gain
access.
In Boddie v. Connecticut,23 the Supreme Court determined that a state
statute requiring a fee to be paid by all persons before any civil action could
be brought in the courts was a violation of due process, as applied to an
indigent seeking a divorce. 24 The state could not deny, solely on the ground of
poverty, access to its court system to individuals seeking certain types of
21. In State ex rel. Old Undervriters, Inc. v. Bell, 244 Ind. 701, 195 N.E.2d 464 (1964). the
court stated that due process was not always violated merely by the absence of counsel to
represent a criminal defendant. Relying on a test of fairness rather than searching for an
underlying "fundamental" right, the court noted that a due process violation will be deemed to
exist only when the assistance of legal counsel is essential to assure the conduct of a fair hearing.
Id. at 704-05, 195 N.E.2d at 466. Use of such broad language, however, creates almost as many
problems as it resolves, since it raises the question of what represents a fair hearing.
22.
23.

See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
401 U.S. 371 (1971).

24. Id. at 380-83. The Court, in finding the fee requirement to be a denial of due process,
noted that the only way a marriage can be dissolved is by resort to the courts. Id. at 376. This
exclusivity of remedy was of primary importance. See id. at 376-77; cf. United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434, 445-46 (1973).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

relief. 25 Although Boddie was an access case which did not raise the issue of
the indigent's right to counsel, it does contain language that at least relates to
such a right. Since "due process requires, at a minimum, that absent a
countervailing state interest of overriding significance, [a person forced to
litigate] be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard, '26 then that opportunity arguably requires the aid of counsel, appointed if necessary.
Another leading access case is United States v. Kras,2 7 wherein the
Supreme Court apparently limited Boddie, upholding a federal statute imposing a fee as a prerequisite to a petition for a bankruptcy proceeding. 28 In
contrast to the divorce in Boddie, judicial proceedings were not considered to
open to the debtor seeking to adjust his legal obligations
be the only methods
29
to his creditors.

It is not clear, however, from the Court's opinions in Boddie and Kras
whether the essential difference between them is that marriage, and hence
divorce, is a "fundamental" right, while a discharge in bankruptcy is not, or
whether the distinction is that there is no other way to dissolve a marriage
than through the courts, while with bankruptcy there is an alternative, albeit
a remote one at times. Boddie involved both a "fundamental" right with
judicial relief being the sole remedy possible. Kras, on the other hand, in the
Court's view involved neither. It is thus unclear as to which of the two factors
(or both) is the key to finding that access may or may not be conditioned on
the payment of a fee. 30 The precedential value of both Boddie and Kras to
the question of the right to appointed counsel in civil cases depends upon
which interpretation is correct. 3 1 While the Court has to date recognized only
25. See 401 U.S. at 383.
26. Id. at 377; see Bartlett v. Kitchin, 76 Misc. 2d 1087, 1090, 352 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (Sup.
Ct. 1973).
27. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).

28. Id. at 446. The Court found that the bankrupt's desire to begin anew was not on the same
constitutional level as the desire to dissolve a marriage as in Boddie. Id. at 445.
29. Id. at 445-46. For a discussion of possible alternatives to judicial relief see id. The Court
found that there was no constitutional right to obtain a discharge in bankruptcy, and that such a
discharge was not a "fundamental" right. Id. at 446. Since there was a rational basis for the fee
requirement, due process was not violated. Id. at 447-49.
30. The uncertainty is not resolved by the Court's decision in Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S.
656 (1973) (per curiam). There, indigent welfare recipients claimed that requiring them to pay a
fee to gain access to the courts to appeal an adverse welfare agency decision was a violation of
due process and equal protection. In finding no such violation, the Court deemed Kras to be
controlling. Id. at 659. Again, however, as in Kras, neither of the two considerations were
present. The interest in obtaining increased welfare payments was not of a "fundamental" nature.
See id. Furthermore, the indigents involved had been given adequate evidentiary hearings
through which they might be able to seek relief. Thus, resort to the courts was not the sole
remedy available. Id. at 659-60.
31. The ultimate resolution actually may lie in when the Court chooses to apply either the
compelling state interest test or the rational basis test.
Where there is a "fundamental" right involved, a state may infringe upon it only if there is a
compelling state interest to do so. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Supreme
Court gave broad application to this test. There, the state had made a classification as to welfare
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a limited number of "fundamental" rights, 32 a right arguably need not be
"fundamental" in order for access to the courts to be the sole effective mode of
obtaining a desired remedy.
Boddie points out the extreme plight that the indigent would confront were
33
he denied access to the courts on the basis of his inability to pay certain fees.
This plight can be analogized to the one endured by an indigent appearing
before a court without the aid of counsel.
There are at present two situations in which courts have intimated that the
services of an attorney for the indigent civil litigant may be constitutionally
required: child custody cases and civil cases in which the privilege against
self-incrimination is or may be invoked.
Danforth v. State Department of Health & Welfare 34 presented the situation of indigent parents seeking to regain custody of their child from a state
welfare department. 35 It was held that in such a situation appointment of
recipients by imposing a one year residence requirement. The Court found that the classification

concerned a "fundamental" right, namely interstate movement. Id. at 638; see B Schwartz,
Constitutional Law 291-92 (1972).
When a "fundamental" right is not in issue, if the Court finds a rational basis for the
classification, then neither equal protection nor due process is violated. See, e.g., Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961);
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
However, it may be argued that the compelling state interest test has broader significance than
its simple application to "fundamental" rights. When a "fundamental" right is not in issue, but
relief to the individual from his specific situation is available for all practical purposes only by
resort to the judicial system, then if the state or federal government should establish a
classification, for example between affluence and indigence, by imposing certain filing fees and
other costs, the classification could be deemed to require a compelling governmental interest,
since relief would be denied the indigent, but accorded to the affluent. Cf. B. Schwartz,
supra at 292.

The main drawback to such an argument is that as yet, the Supreme Court has not recognized
wealth to be a suspect classification. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist.v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1(1973). In San Antonio, the Court noted that "wealth discrimination alone [did not) provide an
adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny." Id. at 29. However, it may be possible that where
the additional factor of the necessity of resort to the judicial system for relief is present, the
classification based on wealth will require a compelling state interest test. For a discussion of the
potential future scope of the law as it relates to the indigent's access to the judicial system see
Comment, The Right of Access to Civil Courts by Indigents: A Prognosis, 24 Am. U.L Rev. 129
(1974).
32. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (fundamental right of interstate
movement and travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (fundamental right to vote); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964) (fundamental right to
travel); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (fundamental rights of
marriage and procreation). Compare Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (fundamental right to education) with San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 30-31
(1973) (no fundamental right to education found, but case resolved on other grounds).
33. See 401 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1971).
34. 303 A.2d 794 (le. 1973).
35. Id. at 795. In such a case, the welfare department has inevitably gained custody of the
child pursuant to statutory authorization. E.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 3792 (Supp. 1974).
The validity of such statutes is not here in question.
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counsel is essential to satisfy due process. 3 6 Beginning within the framework
that the parents' natural right to custody of their children involves constitutional overtones, 37 the court found due process to be applicable regardless of
criminal-civil distinctions that may be made on the basis of the sixth amendment right to counsel in criminal cases. 38 What is involved in the first
instance is governmental interference. That is, in the custody hearing, the full
force of the state is being used against the parents. Confronted with this, the
39
average parent-layman cannot effectively protect his interests in his child.
In addition, the mere fact that a parent is not threatened by deprivation of
liberty does not mean that the parent is not to be subject to severe punishment. According to this court, the loss of custody of a child can easily be
viewed as a punishment more severe than that of imprisonment.4 0 Finally,
the court was wary of the possibility that at such a hearing, the parent is
likely to make statements4 1tending to be self-incriminatory. The result might
be criminal prosecution.
This final consideration influenced the Supreme Court recently in Maness
v. Meyers, 42 which, although not dealing directly with the issue of appointed
counsel, has raised the question of whether the privilege against selfincrimination afforded by the fifth amendment may mandate appointment of
counsel in certain civil litigation. In that case, a city attorney pursuant to
local statute43 applied for an injunction to prevent the distribution of obscene
publications. The injunction also ordered the alleged distributor to appear at
a civil hearing and subpoenaed the publications sought to be restrained. 44 On
the advice of his attorney, the distributor refused to produce the alleged
obscene materials on the ground that to do so created a substantial risk of
self-incrimination with possible criminal prosecution. 45 This position was
advanced despite the fact that the city attorney stated that the hearing
involved no attempt to acquire evidence for future criminal prosecution, and
therefore none of the subpoenaed materials could or would be incriminating. 4 6 Because he advised his client to refuse to produce the materials
36. 303 A.2d at 801.
37. Id. at 796-97.
38. Id. at 799-800; cf. Botein, Appointed Counsel for the Indigent Civil Defendant: A
Constitutional Right Without a Judicial Remedy?, 36 Brooklyn L. Rev. 368, 369-70 (1970);
Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and the Indigent's
Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 Iowa L. Rev. 223, 248 (1970).
39. See 303 A.2d at 799.
40. Id. at 800.
41. Id. at 799-800. It is submitted that this should be a prime consideration in any decision on
the right to appointed counsel. Even if no criminal sanctions are involved in a particular
proceeding, the potential for criminal prosecution may arise unless protection of counsel is

afforded, and there should be no hesitation in providing such assistance.
42. 95 S. Ct. 584 (1975).
43. Law of June 14, 1971, ch. 887, § 3, [1971] Tex. Laws 2725 (repealed 1973). Compare
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4667(a)(3) (Supp. 1974).
44. See 95 S. Ct. at 587.

45.

Id. at 587-88.

46.

Id. at 588. It appears, however, as petitioner noted, that the mere representation by the

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

1975]

subpoenaed, the counsel for the distributor was held in contempt of court.47
The Supreme Court decided the case on the narrow issue of "whether a
lawyer may be held in contempt for advising his client, during the trial of a
civil case, to refuse to produce material demanded by a subpoena duces lecum
when the lawyer believes in good faith the material may tend to incriminate
his client." 48 The Court's decision that the attorney was not in contempt of
court has application well beyond the scope of these restrictive words, since if
an attorney may be held in contempt of court in a civil action merely for
advising his client, then the court is effectively denying such client the right to
advice of counsel.
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination has been broadly
construed. According to the Court, its purpose is to ensure that a person will
not be forced to produce evidence that at some future time might be used in a
criminal prosecution against him. 49 As such, it is not relevant that the refusal
to give evidence has occurred in a civil rather than a criminal matter; the
privilege has application to any proceeding, whether "civil or criminal,
adminstrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory."5s Moreover, it is
irrelevant that the evidence sought to be produced may not lead directly to
criminal prosecution. The Court indicated that the privilege operates just as
strongly to protect against evidence that supplies a "link in the chain of
evidence" from which prosecution might follow."' It is sufficient that the
individual involved entertains a reasonable belief that the information he is
asked to supply could be used in a future criminal action against him. 5-2 From
this it is clear that in Maness the Court was looking not to the nature of the
immediate proceeding, but to whether the proceeding involved circumstances
which could lead to future prosecution, thereby necessitating advice of
counsel in the immediate proceeding. In light of these principles, the Court
found that Maness, the attorney, could not be held for contempt for advising
his client of the privilege against self-incrimination. 5 3 This result itself certainly does not dictate a conclusion that the Court has opened the door to an
absolute right of a civil litigant to appointed counsel, but it arguably indicates
at least one instance where constitutional
rights may be violated by the failure
5 4
to appoint counsel in civil litigation.
city attorney is not a guarantee that no criminal prosecution would result. The assertion is
binding only on the party making it, not on others who might later choose to prosecute. See id.
47. Id. at 589. It should be noted in the interest of clarity that the attorney involved, Maness,
acted in good faith throughout the entire episode. Moreover, the record revealed that Maness had
advised his client of the privilege against self-incrimination in the fifth amendment. He had not
expressly instructed his client not to produce the publication involved. Id. at 590.
48. Id.at 591.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 592.
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972).
95 S. Ct. at 592.

52.

Id.

53.

Id. at 594-95.

54. Id. at 595. The Maness decision may, however, have far-reaching effects The privilege
against self-incrimination is of a very technical nature. The average layman is not able, nor
should he be expected, to understand fully the scope or effects of the privilege. The Court. in
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Maness v. Meyers was a unanimous decision. " In a concurring opinion,5 6
Justice Stewart stated his interpretation of the Court's decision:
The Court today holds that the constitutional privilege against compulsory selfincrimination embraces the right of a testifying party to the unfettered advice of
counsel in a civil proceeding.
...The premise underlying the conclusion ... must be that there is a constitutional
right ... to some advice of counsel .... The Court's rationale thus inexorably implies
that counsel must be appointed for any indigent witness, whether
or not he is a party,
57
in any proceeding in which his testimony can be compelled.
5

The Maness case represents an important development in the law of the
right to counsel in civil litigation, since it recognized implicitly that the
grounding of the requirement of appointed counsel solely on the nature of the
litigation in issue (civil as opposed to criminal) is fallacious. In Maness, the
Court looked to the type of issues involved and whether such issues might
potentially lead to a violation or inadvertent waiver of a constitutional
privilege which could be avoided by appointing counsel at the very start.
Maness, however, is specifically involved only with the fifth amendment
privilege. It is thus apparent that the application of the decision may be
restricted to those rights or privileges specifically granted by the Bill of
Rights.
The discussion in this section thus far has been concerned with finding a
right for an indigent to have counsel appointed to represent him in a civil
proceeding. It is apparent that such a right has not yet been squarely
recognized. 58 The case law does, however, seem to be developing exceptions
under which such a right will be recognized.
B.

The Discretionary Appointment of Counsel in Civil Cases

For the present, it is safe to say that indigent civil litigants, in both state
and federal courts, have not completely been left to face the vagaries of the
law totally unaided by trained members of the bar. Courts regularly appoint
counsel to represent indigents in civil matters. Some do so on the basis of an
fact, speaks of the possibility of waiving the privilege unknowingly. Id. The range of situations in
which such a possibility may occur is vast.
55. See id. at 584.
56. Id. at 597 (Stewart, J., concurring).
57. Id. Justice Stewart also indicated that he would not go this far in declaring an absolute
right to appointed counsel in a civil action, since the case at bar did not demand such a
conclusion. He concurred, however, on different grounds.
In a footnote to its decision, the Court stated that it did not believe that its rationale necessarily
lead to the conclusions reached by Justice Stewart. Id. at 595 n.15. However, the Court's attack
was actually directed at the other grounds on which Justice Stewart concurred, rather than the
conclusions which he reached in the quoted portion of the text. It appears then that Justice
Stewart's view of the implications of the Court's holding remains sound.
58. See Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (civil action for
conversion).
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inherent power in the court;5 9 some do so on the basis of statutory provisions; 60 others, on the basis of both inherent and statutory power. 6 1 What
they share in common is that the appointment, when made, is entirely

discretionary.

62

This discretionary power is rarely defined. Certainly, the Supreme Court in

the Maness decision has, at the very least, intimated that counsel should be
appointed when the fifth amendment privilege is involved. Absent such
constitutional considerations, it is usually a matter of the individual63 preferences of the judge before whom the request for counsel is made.
In New York, the courts have indicated several specific grounds to support
the exercise of discretion in favor of appointment of counsel in civil litigation.
In two matrimonial actions, the New York courts have found the appointment of counsel to be proper. One court recognized the principle that no
indigent should be denied the meaningful opportunity to adjudicate legal
claims. 64 The court reasoned that in order to assure equal and effective access
6to the judicial system, an indigent was entitled to have counsel appointed.
Another court found that the unique nature of the state's interest in the union
of marriage, as well as the rights and relationships between the persons
59. Dade County v. McCrary, 260 So. 2d 543, 545 (Fla. App. 1972); cf. Caron v. Betit. 131
Vt 53, 300 A.2d 618 (1972).
60. Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Sandoval v. Rattikin.
395 S.W.2d 889, 893-94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 901 (1966). The respective
statutory provisions are 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1917 (1964).
61. Compare People v. Monahan, 17 N.Y.2d 310, 313, 217 N.E.2d 664, 666, 270 N.Y.S.2d
613, 615-16 (1966) (inherent power) with Jacox v. Jacox, 43 App. Div. 2d 716, 717, 350 N.Y.S.2d
435, 436 (2d Dep't 1973) (statutory power pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.RI § 1102 (McKinney Supp.
1974)).
, 288 N.E.2d 602, 603 (1972); Hotel
,
Mass.
62. See, e.g., Peace v. Peace, Martha Washington Management Co. v. Swinick, 66 Misc. 2d 833, 835, 322 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141
(Sup. Ct. 1971); Sandoval v. Rattikin, 395 S.W.2d 889, 893-94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 901 (1966).
63. This is especially true when the power of appointment is deemed to be inherent. There is
seldom anything in the opinion indicating what guidelines are to be followed or what cir288 N.E.2d 602,
Mass. -,
-,
cumstances are to be considered. See Peace v. Peace, 603 (1972), in which the probate court was told to consider appointing counsel if the litigant were
indigent and desired such appointment. When appointment is authorized pursuant to statutory
regulation, there are of course some guidelines provided in the statute, but nevertheless it is
necessary to look to case law to determine how the courts have interpreted the meaning of the
guidelines. For example, in Arkansas, the court must be satisfied that the applicant for
appointment of counsel has a meritorious cause of action. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-403 (Repl. Vol.
1962). New York specifies instances in which an indigent may have appointed counsel, such as a
hearing to inquire into the commitment of a person alleged to be mentally ill or a narcotics addict,
or a hearing into the detention of an individual in a state institution. N.Y. Judiciary Law §
35(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974). However, despite the presence of specific circumstances, the
court is still at liberty to appoint counsel or to deny counsel almost at will.
64. Bartlett v. Kitchin, 76 Misc. 2d 1087, 1090, 352 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (Sup. Ct 1973)_
65. Id.
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involved, dictates that counsel should be appointed for indigent matrimonial
litigants. 66 Although the court did not expand upon its decision, it is submitted that the need for legal assistance rests not merely in the state's interest in
preserving the bonds of matrimony, 67 but also in ensuring that upon dissolution of the
marriage, the respective rights of the parties will be fully
68
protected.
From this it appears that the New York courts have adopted a test of
fairness in using the discretionary power to appoint counsel for indigents.
Whether this will be applied to all civil proceedings is yet to be determined.
However, under this vague rubric, it is apparent that the indigent civil
litigant's right to free counsel will depend upon the discretion of individual
judges, and that the judge will be guided in his decision by his own subjective
idea of fairness. The only more explicit test yet devised by the courts is the
Maness approach, which arguably dictates appointment of counsel to indigent
civil litigants whenever the possibility of waiver of a constitutional right or
privilege arises. The impact that this decision will have in this area remains to
be seen.
IV.

THE SOURCE OF THE APPOINTED COUNSEL:

RESORT TO THE

PRIVATE BAR

When a court is faced with an indigent's request for appointment of
counsel, two practical problems immediately arise: first, from what source
may the court select an attorney to represent an indigent; and second, who, if
anyone, is to bear the cost of compensation.
It is true, of course, that there are many programs and organizations which
have been created to help the indigent by providing legal services. There is a
question, however, as to how effective these services are in delivering legal
assistance to those indigents who require it and in providing adequate legal
assistance. 69 An indigent seeking legal counsel must begin his search through
either private legal aid or some form of public legal service. Only if this fails
should he be permitted to request counsel from the private bar. 70 It has
become almost accepted fact that neither private legal aid, depending as it
must upon charitable contributions, nor legal assistance programs, such as
66.

Jacox v. Jacox, 43 App. Div. 2d 716, 717, 350 N.Y.S.2d 435, 436 (2d Dcp't 1973).

67. The New York State Constitution reads in part: "[N]or shall any divorce be granted
otherwise than by due judicial proceedings . . . ." N.Y. Const. art. I, § 9(1).
68. In addition, there are other types of actions in which New York courts have found
appointment of counsel to be appropriate. In an action by an indigent tenant against a landlord,
counsel was appointed because the court reasoned that there is a likelihood of unfairness as a
result of the differences in expertise between the attorney representing the landlord and the tenant
representing himself. Hotel Martha Washington Management Co. v. Swinick, 66 Misc. 2d 833,
835, 322 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141 (App. T. 1971).
69. See Silver, The Imminent Failure of Legal Services for the Poor: Why and How to Limit
Caseload, 46 J. Urban L. 217 (1969); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76
Yale L.J. 545, 546 (1967).
70. Cf. Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 Yale L.J. 545, 546 (1967).
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those under the federal Economic Opportunity Act, ' are physically capable
of administering to even a majority of the requests from poor persons for assistance in litigating civil matters. 72 Despite the current flood of lawyers being
graduated by law schools throughout the country, the demand for legal aid to
the indigent still continues to exceed the available supply. 73 The consequences
of this shortage are apparent. First, the number of cases that must be handled
by the available attorneys is excessive, with the result that the time available
for the preparation of individual cases is lessened. The attorney faced with
this predicament may have no choice but to compromise the case of one client
for another. 74 Any attempt to strike a balance among cases is made all the
more difficult by the uncertain nature of judicial proceedings in general.
Much time must initially be spent on a particular matter before the attorney
can even conjecture the amount of time that must ultimately be devoted to it.
The second consequence concerns selection among the different classes of
cases. To illustrate, most of the civil litigation embarked upon by poor
persons is in the area of domestic relations. 7s Yet many legal aid programs
76
have selectively chosen to refuse to provide counsel for divorce actions,
because of the lack of available attorneys. In fact, it has recently been held to
be an abuse of discretion for a court to appoint an attorney when the
particular legal assistance program involved has objected to such assignment
77
because of certain limitations on the program's authority to render legal aid.
The conclusion is unavoidable that in order to provide adequate legal
assistance to indigent civil litigants, the courts must go beyond the existing
private and public legal aid programs and turn to the private bar for some
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2994(d) (1970).
72. Silver, The Imminent Failure of Legal Services for the Poor. Why and How to Limit
Caseload, 46 J. Urban L. 217 (1969); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76
Yale L.J. 545, 546 (1967). One of the reasons for this inability with respect to civil actions may be
the preferred status given to criminal defendants.
73. Perhaps with constant increases in the number of trained attorneys, the percentage
choosing to make themselves available to help poor persons will increase, thus dosing the gap
between supply and demand. For a discussion of the problem see Silver. The Imminent Failure
of Legal Services for the Poor Why and How to Limit Caseload, 46 J. Urban L 217. 217-21
(1969).
74. Regarding the effects of this alternative see id. at 224-27.
75. Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and the
Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 Iowa L. Rev. 223. 231-32 (1970).
76. Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases. 76 Yale L.J. 545, 553 (1967); see
Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 381, 413-15
(1965). The selective process is not restricted to divorce actions. Note, The Indigent's Right to
Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 Yale L.J. 545, 546 (1967); cf. Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil
Litigation, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1322, 1337-38 (1966).
77. Cerami v. Cerami, 44 App. Div. 2d 890, 355 N.Y.S.2d 861 (4th Dep't 1974). In that case
in an action for divorce, the court assigned the Monroe County Legal Assistance Corporation to
represent an indigent litigant. The Corporation was a federally funded agency whose participation in legal services was restricted. The original request for appointment of counsel had been
made pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1102 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
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relief. While this may seem to be a simple solution to a difficult dilemma,
there is a multitude of problems that must be resolved before such a practice
can be put into operation, not the least of which is the problem of compensation.
V.

THE "RIGHT"

TO COMPENSATION

FOR THE APPOINTED ATTORNEY

A. Criminal Cases
Direct constitutional attacks have been levied against appointing counsel
without compensation. These are concerned primarily with the fifth amend7
ment prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation.
There are two elements which must exist for this constitutional provision to
apply: there must be a "taking;" it must be a "taking of property." The vast
majority of jurisdictions has held that the absence of compensation is not
violative of the fifth amendment. The basis for these decisions is that there
was no "taking" involved. 79 In reaching this conclusion, the courts state that
the license to practice law carries with it the condition that the attorney will
undertake the representation of indigent criminal defendants without monetary reward. 8 0 Persons seeking to practice law are charged with the
knowledge of this condition, and by entering the profession are deemed to
give consent to satisfying this condition. It follows then that the appointed
attorney cannot later claim there had been a "taking" of his services.8 t Since
there is no "taking," the majority of jurisdictions does not reach the question
of whether the attorney's services can be considered "property" under the fifth
amendment. 82
78. U.S. Const. amend. V.
79. United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635-36 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978
(1966).
80. Id. at 635; Young v. State, 255 So. 2d 318, 321 (Miss. 1971); see House v. Whitis, 64
Tenn. 690 (1875).
It is well established that an attorney is an officer of the court, and thus he owes various duties
and obligations to the court. E.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378 (1867); United
States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966); Jackson v.
State, 413 P.2d 488, 490 (Alas. 1966); People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 Il.2d 24, 28-29, 219
N.E.2d 337, 340 (1966); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 411, 217 A.2d 441, 447 (1966); In re
Zuckerman, 20 N.Y.2d 430, 439, 231 N.E.2d 718, 721-22, 285 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 925 (1968).
81. United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635-36 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978
(1966); see Scott v. State, 216 Tenn. 375, 385-88, 392 S.W.2d 681, 685-87 (1965); cf. Dade
County v. McCrary, 260 So. 2d 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Weiner v. Fulton County, 113
Ga. App. 343, 148 S.E.2d 143, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966).
82. An excellent summary of the positions taken by these majority jurisdictions has recently
been set forth by the Supreme Court of Washington as follows: "In favor of the majority rule, It is
argued that to serve the cause of justice on behalf of an indigent is a professional honor for which
an appointed counsel need not and ought not demand compensation . . . ; that such gratuitous
service is a duty imposed by tradition, the Canons of Professional Ethics, and the attorney's oath
and is a price paid by the attorney for the privileges attaching to his profession . . . ; that
gratuitous service may be required of an attorney because representation of an indigent is a duty
incident to his station as an officer of the court charged with the administration of justice and
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It seems reasonable, however, to say that the services of an attorney may
indeed be a form of "property. '8 3 If it then can be said that failure to
compensate appointed counsel is a "taking," the right of compensation would
fall clearly within the scope of the fifth amendment. There is a growing
minority of jurisdictions which recognizes that an unconstitutional "taking" is
involved, and four jurisdictions have expressly held that there is a right to
compensation for an attorney appointed by the court to represent an indigent
criminal defendant. 4 The earlier minority cases simply found that a right to
expect compensation is consistent with the attorney's obligations as an officer
of the court. They reasoned variously either that the appointment of counsel
pursuant to statutory mandate creates an obligation upon those responsible
for the legislation to pay reasonable compensation;8s or that the statutory
power of the courts to appoint counsel implies a promise to pay;8 6 or that the
legislature cannot demand the services of an individual relating directly to his
8 7
profession without also providing for remuneration.
there is no constitutional requirement that every public official be paid for his services.
; that
courts have no power over public funds collected for public purposes absent legislative authorization ... ; and that requiring an attorney to render gratuitous service on behalf of an indigent is
not a taking of his property for public purposes without just compensation contrary to constitutional provisions." Honore v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 77 Wash. 2d 660,
667-78, 466 P.2d 485, 495-96 (1970) (citations omitted).
83. See Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12, 15, 447 P.2d 193, 195 (1968); cf. Bender
v. Board of Regents, 262 App. Div. 627, 631, 30 N.Y.S.2d 779, 784 (3d Dep't 1941) ('Itlhe right
to practice dentistry is, like the right to practice any other profession, a valuable property right
... ."). See also Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga. App. 343, 148 S.E.2d 143, cert. denied, 385
U.S. 958 (1966).
84. These four minority jurisdictions have stated that the appointment of counsel to serve
without compensation is wrong. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 11, 14 (1854); Hall v. Washington
County, 2 Greene 473 (Iowa 1850); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (196b); County of
Dane v. Smith, 13 Wis. 654 (1861). These courts have recognized that there is more at stake than
mere tradition. At the very basis of this view is the fact that to the lawyer, the legal profession is
a means of livelihood. Webb v. Baird, supra at 14. As such it should be accorded no different
treatment from any other. Though still recognized as an officer of the court, thus owing a duty to
the court, the attorney nevertheless is not obliged to render free service to the public when it is
demanded of him. State v. Rush, supra at 410, 217 A.2d at 447. The attorney is certainly not a
public officer. Ferguson v. Pottawattamie County, 224 Iowa 516, 278 N.W. 223 (1938).
This distinction is an important one, for it takes into consideration the scope of the phrase
"officer of the court" which the majority jurisdictions do not. Yet it retains the basic concepts of
the legal profession as honorable and steeped in traditions. The minority courts shift the emphasis
of these responsibilities so as to better conform with our present constitutional and legal
institutions. It is evident therefore that in reaching the conclusion that appointed counsel are
entitled to compensation, the minority courts are not abandoning the time-honored obligations
adhering to the legal profession. Instead, they find that just as attorneys are burdened with
certain obligations, so are they entitled to certain rights. Hall v. Washington County, supra at
476. One of these rights is that of compensation for their services. Id.
85. See Board of Comm'rs v. Courtney, 105 Ind. 311, 4 N.E. 896 (1886); Ferguson v
Pottawattarnie County, 224 Iowa 516, 278 N.W. 223 (1938).
86. County of Dane v. Smith, 13 Wis. 654, 656-58 (1861).
87. Id. at 657-58.
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The more recent cases, in which several jurisdictions have joined in the
minority viewpoint, recognize that new factors warrant consideration in light
of the developing law concerning the indigent's right to counsel. In State v.
Rush, 88 New Jersey found that a serious policy issue of fairness was presented.8 9 The New Jersey court opined that the constitutional right to counsel
in criminal cases established by Gideon9" is an obligation imposed upon the
state and not upon the bar. 9 1 The state, in discharging this obligation by
appointment of counsel, must compensate the atttorney since he is not an
officer of the state. 92 The court in Rush held on this basis that the courts of
New Jersey could no longer require attorneys alone to carry the burden which
in fact belonged to the state.0 3 Missouri has recently chosen to follow the
reasoning of the New Jersey court and has held that attorneys will no longer
be required to render uncompensated services to indigent criminal defendants, in order to discharge the constitutional burden belonging to the state. 94
In Bradshaw v. Ball,95 Kentucky joined the growing number of jurisdictions
espousing the pro-compensation viewpoint. The court reasoned that the
state's duty to afford counsel to indigent criminal defendants can be discharged only in a manner which does not deprive the attorney of his property
without compensation.96
B.

Civil Cases

Even if one were to agree with the minority jurisdictions that an attorney
appointed by a court to represent an indigent criminal defendant is entitled to
compensation, it does not follow that an attorney appointed to represent civil
litigants is also entitled to compensation. The vast majority of cases in which
compensation is discussed involve criminal prosecutions, since the expanding
right to counsel movement began in the criminal area. Only recently has the
problem arisen in civil litigation. The history to date indicates that the courts
generally will hold that an attorney appointed to represent a civil litigant
should not expect to be compensated.
88.
89.

46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966).
Id. at 408, 217 A.2d at 446.

90. It is recognized that the scope of the Gideon case has been subject to review by
subsequent decisions. The general statement in the text is meant only to indicate the constitutional nature of the right.
91. 46 N.J. at 408, 217 A.2d at 445-46.
92. Id. at 411-12, 217 A.2d at 447.
93. Id. at 412-13, 217 A.2d at 448.
94. State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1971). The court found that private attorneys were
being treated unfairly since other individuals in the criminal judicial process such as prosecuting
attorneys were not compelled to serve without compensation. Id. at 572-73.
95. 487 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1972).
96. Id. at 298. One reason for this decision is that no other profession has been required to
bear such a burden. Id. The decision in Bradshaw is the only clear example of a court attempting
to balance the relative rights of the indigent accused of crime with those of the attorney who is
expected to represent him in his defense. For an excellent summary of the position espoused by
the growing number of pro-compensation minority jurisdictions see Honore v. Washington State
Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 77 Wash. 2d 660, 678-80, 466 P.2d 485, 496-97 (1970).
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The Code of Professional Responsibility provides in part that
[t]he basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay ultimately
rests upon the individual lawyer, and personal involvement in the problems of the
disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer.
. . . The rendition of free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues
to be an obligation of each lawyer, but the efforts of individual lawyers are often not
enough to meet the need ....

this need for legal services. 97

Every lawyer should support all proper efforts to meet

In Bartlett v. Kitchin, 98 a lower court in New York, in reliance on this
provision, held that the duty of an attorney to represent indigent litigants
without compensation applies to civil proceedings as well as criminal prosecutions. 99 Moreover, there is some indirect support for such a proposition.
Many civil proceedings have involved the appointment of counsel; matrimonial actions are the most prevalent. It has been asserted that in the absence of
statutory authority, a court in appointing counsel in a matrimonial action
does not have the power to require either the state or local government to
provide monetary compensation. 00 However, lack of authority to offer
compensation does not appear to hamper the ability of the court to assign
counsel. It must follow then, that in a civil matrimonial action, assigned
counsel may be called to serve without compensation.
One jurisdiction, Utah, has squarely held that an attorney may not be
compelled by legislative fiat to represent indigent civil litigants. 10 ' There, the
policy had been to assign counsel without compensation to indigent criminal
defendants. 102 However, in Bedford v. Salt Lake County,10 3 the Supreme
Court of Utah was presented with a statute under which the legislature
authorized the assignment of an attorney, without compensation, to represent
an allegedly insane person at an involuntary proceeding to determine the
person's sanity.10 4 Holding strictly to the concept that the attorney is an
officer of the court, rather than of the state, the court concluded that this
attempt by the legislature to compel an attorney to serve without compensation was an unlawful taking of property.' 0 5 This decision, however, leaves open
97. Code of Professional Responsibility, N.Y. Judiciary Law, EC 2-25 (McKinney Supp.
1974). See also id. EC 2-29.
98. 76 Misc. 2d 1087, 352 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
99. Id. at 1091, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 115. The court recognized, however, that "the Bar cannot
be expected to bear the burden of representing indigent parties in matrimonial actions to the
extent thatthis court can envision may come to pass." Id. at 1092, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 1!5 (dictum).
100. Jacox v. Jacox, 43 App. Div. 2d 716, 717, 350 N.Y.S.2d 435, 436-37 (2d Dep't 1973);
accord, Cerani v. Cerami, 44 App. Div. 2d 890, 355 N.Y.S.2d 861 (4th Dep't 1974). In an
analogous situation, involving an action by a welfare recipient, Vermont has stated that in the
absence of statutory authorization, payment can be justified only if constitutionally mandated.
Caron v. Betit, 131 Vt. 53, 300 A.2d 618 (1972). The court did not fifid such a mandate.
101. Compare Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193 (1968) with
Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 133 P.2d 325 (1943).
102. Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 133 P.2d 325 (1943).
103. 22 Utah 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193 (1968).
104. Id. at 12-13, 447 P.2d at 193.
105. Id. at 14-15, 447 P.2d at 194-95. The court analogized the situation to one in which the
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the question of whether the courts in Utah would themselves be permitted to
assign counsel to an indigent civil litigant without providing compensation to
the attorney. It is stated in the opinion that the defense of indigents is a
matter between the attorney and the court,' 0 6 and this clearly implies that it
is the duty of the court to determine when to call upon the uncompensated
services of the bar and that such authority is not within the province of the
legislature.
Similarly, in Illinois, even though there is a statute providing a certain sum
as compensation for assigned counsel, the court in People ex rel. Conn v.
Randolph'0 7 held that the statute could not be applied within the requirements of the Constitution if assigned counsel is forced to suffer "extreme, if
not ruinous, loss of practice and income and must expend large out-of-pocket
sums in the course of trial."' 0 8 Therefore, in order to prevent insufferable
hardship to the attorney, the court asserted that the inherent judicial power to
appoint counsel also included the power to award compensation.10 9
VI.

THE PROBLEM OF FUNDING

Coincident with the issues of right to appointed counsel in civil or criminal
proceedings and the right of the attorney to compensation for his services is
the basic problem of who is to bear this expense.
While there are examples of courts awarding compensation to appointed
counsel without statutory authority,"10 the feasibility of this approach is
questionable since it is unclear how the judicial system will obtain the funds
to enforce such orders. Clearly the appropriation of funds from the public
treasury is a function of the legislature rather than the judiciary.I' Although
a number of state legislatures continue to deny compensation to assigned
legislature simply by enacting a statute would require a physician to treat a sick or injured
indigent without remuneration. Clearly the attempt was a taking and also could be seen as a form
of involuntary servitude. Id. at 14, 447 P.2d at 194. Furthermore, there was a taking by the
state, even though the services were to be rendered to someone other than the state itself, namely
the indigent. Id. at 15, 447 P.2d at 195.
106. Id. at 14, 447 P.2d at 194.
107. 35 Il.2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966).
108. Id. at 30, 219 N.E.2d at 341.
109. Id. at 29, 219 N.E.2d at 340. But cf. Board of Supervisors v. Bailey, 236 So. 2d 420,
423 (Miss. 1970).
110. See People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 Ill.
2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966). Washington
has recognized the constantly increasing burden that is being placed on the legal profession to
serve indigents not only in criminal actions and appeals, but also in certain civil commitment
situations. Honore v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 77 Wash. 2d 660, 679,
466 P.2d 485, 496 (1970). Thus, even in the absence of a statute, an attorney who prosecutes a
non-frivolous appeal from a disposition of a habeas corpus petition is entitled to be compensated
from public funds. Id. at 680, 466 P.2d at 496.
111. Board of Supervisors v. Bailey, 236 So. 2d 420, 423 (Miss. 1970); see Jackson v. State,
413 P.2d 488, 490 (Alas. 1966); cf. Honore v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles,
77 Wash. 2d 660, 679, 466 P.2d 485, 496 (1970).
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counsel,
many legislatures have answered the call and, along with a federal
statute, provide certain forms of remuneration." 3
The uncertainty of the courts in this area, in the absence of specific statutory
directives, is illustrated by the struggle of the New York courts with the
imposition of court costs and fees of indigent civil litigation. "1 4 In resolving
the question of who is to bear these expenses, the New York Court of Appeals
has held that until the legislature speaks on the issue, the burden of court fees
and costs, specifically publication costs, rests on the local governing unit,
rather than on the state. 1 5 The court, acutely aware of the financial impact
that this added expense might have on municipal budgets, did sanction the
use of judicially devised service as an alternative to the statutory method for
service by publication. 1 6 Since that decision by New York's highest court,
112.

E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-403 (Repl. Vol. 1962); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 33, § 5 (Smith-Hurd

Supp. 1974).

113. E.g., Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 925.035
(1973) (attorney appointed to represent a defendant in a capital case may obtain compensation not
exceeding $750 for trial and $500 for appeal); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.52(4) (1969) (reasonable
compensation for attorney appointed in civil actions involving neglected, dependent, or delinquent children); id. § 775.5 (Supp. 1974) (reasonable compensation for attorney appointed to
defend any person charged with a crime); N.Y. Judiciary Law § 35(2) (McKinney 1968) (limited
specific compensation for attorney appointed in certain habeas corpus proceedings). See also N.Y.
County Law § 722-b (McKinney Supp. 1974). It should be noted that even when the state
legislature has provided for reasonable compensation to an appointed attorney, two of the
jurisdictions representing the minority view that assigned counsel is entitled to be paid for his
services have modified their previous rulings and held that the specified amount of payment
though not full compensation is still sufficient to allow the courts to compel the bar to serve the
indigent. Compare Woodbury County v. Anderson, 164 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 1969) with Ferguson
v. Pottawattamie County, 224 Iowa 516, 278 N.W. 223 (1938). Compare Green Lake County v.
Waupaca County, 113 Wis. 425, 89 N.W. 549 (1902) with County of Dane v. Smith, 13 Wis. 654
(1861); see notes 84-87 supra and accompanying text.
114. To illustrate, there is a line of cases in New York concerning the question of who must
bear certain litigation expenses of an indigent in a matrimonial action. As will be recalled, it is a
violation of due process to deny access to the courts to an indigent seeking a divorce merely
because of the inability to pay court costs and fees. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971);
see notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text. New York has followed the general rule that
absent legislation, the court has no authority to order payment for services by counsel. In re
Alesi, 297 N.Y. 190, 195-96, 78 N.E.2d 467, 470 (1948) (action to determine mental condition);
Smiley v. Smiley, 45 App. Div. 2d 785, 356 N.Y.S.2d 733 (3d Dep't 1974); see Snitkin v. Taylor,
276 N.Y. 148, 11 N.E.2d 573 (1937). Where, however, there is a constitutional mandate
involved, such a rule must necessarily become subordinate. See Smiley v. Smiley, supra at 785,
356 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
115. Deason v. Deason, 32 N.Y.2d 93, 95, 296 N.E.2d 229, 230, 343 N.Y.S.2d 321, 322
(1973). New Hampshire by statute makes fees for service of process payable by the county. N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 499:18-b (Supp. 1973). Iowa calls for compensation by the county for counsel
assigned in actions concerning neglected, dependent, or delinquent children. Iowa Code Ann.
§ 232.52(4) (1969).

116. 32 N.Y.2d at 95, 296 N.E.2d at 230, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 323. The alternative was
pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(5) (McKinney Supp. 1974), and involves judicially devised
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the issue of whether attorney compensation may also be imposed on the local
government has arisen in several of that state's intermediate courts. The
response has been consistently in the negative. 117 Nor may payment for
counsel be imposed on the state without appropriate legislation."18
In light of these decisions by the New York courts, it seems clear that
compensation for court appointed attorneys will not be imposed by the courts
on local governing units. The alternative is, of course, express legislation.
Proposed legislation might be modeled upon an existing New York statute
which provides for compensation to assigned counsel with respect to proceedings on a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the propriety of various civil
custody matters.' 1 9 The statute sets a maximum amount that is compensable,
but also provides that the court may award an amount in excess of these
limits where circumstances are unusual. 120 By its express terms, the legislation calls for "[a]ll expenses for compensation and reimbursement under [the
statute to] be a state charge to be paid out of funds appropriated to the office
of the state administrator of the judicial conference for that purpose. '"'2
Clearly such a statute, authorizing fixed compensation, but also providing
for judicial discretion in unusual circumstances, and designating the fund
from which compensation is to be acquired, is a viable general alternative to
the present confusion. Under such a statute the legislature could provide for
the fixed and discretionary compensation outlined above and in addition
expressly provide that the appointment of counsel in civil cases is in the sound
discretion of the courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
While courts have recognized that an individual accused of crime is entitled
to appointment of counsel when he cannot obtain an attorney to represent
him, the general rule with respect to indigent civil litigants continues to be
that no such right to counsel exists.
From this general rule, however, the courts have begun to carve out certain
exceptions. In so doing, courts are beginning to recognize that there are
certain aspects of civil litigation which are analogous to criminal prosecutions,
thus making appointment of counsel essential. Situations in which this
service. For a discussion of the important role this statute has assumed as a result of the Deason
decision see McLaughlin, Supplementary Practice Commentary, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308:5 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
117. Smiley v. Smiley, 45 App. Div. 2d 785, 356 N.Y.S.2d 733 (3d Dep't 1974); Jacox v.
Jacox, 43 App. Div. 2d 716, 350 N.Y.S.2d 435 (2d Dep't 1973); see Bartlett v. Kitchin, 76 Misc.
2d 1087, 352 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
118. As stated by the court in Jacox v. Jacox, 43 App. Div. 2d 716, 350 N.Y.S.2d 435 (2d
Dep't 1973): "Absent statutory authority for the payment of assigned counsel in matrimonial
actions .. . counsel must be provided by the Bar through the personal obligation of its members,
traditionally recognized, to willingly accept assignments made by the Bench and to help those
who cannot afford financially to help themselves." Id. at 717, 350 N.YS.2d at 436-37.
119. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 35(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974); id. § 35(2) (McKinney 1968).
120. Id. § 35(2).
121. Id. § 35(4).
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analogy can be applied are admittedly limited. An example of this is the civil
proceeding in which there are criminal overtones, such as a delinquency
22
proceeding. 1

A more promising area through which a right to counsel in civil litigation
might be forthcoming is evidenced by the Supreme Court's decision in .Maness
v. Meyers. 123 While Maness may be viewed as supplying a foundation upon
which a civil litigant will be entitled to appointment of counsel, it would be
restricted to situations involving the possibility of waiving the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. It is not necessary, however, to
limit a right to counsel argument solely to this specific constitutional guarantee. Admittedly, self-incrimination may be the constitutional privilege most
easily waived. This does not mean that other privileges in the Bill of Rights
should not be given the same consideration. A possible test that the courts
might wish to consider is one in which counsel will be appointed to any
indigent whenever the circumstances of the case may result in a waiver or
violation of any right guaranteed by the Constitution.
When the sovereign has on the one hand given an individual, purportedly
as an incident of his citizenship, the privilege to go to court to adjudicate a
specific claim, it should not allow that privilege to be effectively abrogated in
the case of indigent litigants by lack of adequate legal assistance. Proceeding
pro se, even in the presence of the most protective trial judge, the average
litigant may waive certain privileges, fail to assert some essential fact or issue,
or even enter into an unconscionable settlement for lack of knowledge of his
full rights under the law.
Once counsel is appointed, the problem of compensating him for his
services arises. 124 As this Note has indicated, many state legislatures, as well
as the federal government, have responded by providing a token amount of
remuneration to the appointed counsel. With the constantly growing need for
the court to call on members of the bar to represent indigent civil and
criminal litigants, the present statutory scheme will not suffice.12-' Furthermore, it is clear that the courts must rely on the legislature to provide the
financial resources for compensation. Most courts recognize that in the
absence of statutory authorization their power to order compensation is
severely limited. Consequently, some jurisdictions have chosen to refuse to
122. See note 5 supra.
123. 95 S. Ct 584 (1975); see notes 42-58 supra and accompanying text.
124. The issue of contingency fees is not here under consideration. It is recognized that in
certain situations, there may be no need for a court to be concerned with the manner in which
court appointed counsel will be compensated, since an attorney can take on the representation of
an indigent on a contingency basis. There are in fact state statutory provisions which call for an
attorney's expenses to be paid out of any sum that the indigent litigant recovers by way of
prosecuting his claim. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1102(d) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
125. For a discussion of certain doubts as to the capacity of the legal profession to meet the
burden of representing indigents on court appointment see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U S 25,
56-60 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). Though the majority of the Court did not share Justice
Powell's reservations at that time, id. at 37 n.7, with the increasing scope of right to counsel in
civil litigation, the doubts to Justice Powell may come to be realized.
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appoint counsel at all. This is manifestly an untenable resolution of the
problem. It is up to the legislature to respond to the increasing number of
court appointed attorneys by providing the courts with the means to award
just compensation to those called upon to serve the indigent litigant.

Alan Jay Stein

